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Executive Summary 
 
NAFTA is among the most scrutinized trade deals ever implemented, both because of the 
size of the North American region it encompasses and because it was a landmark deal that 
set the framework for much subsequent bilateral and multilateral trade policy throughout 
the world. Most previous reviews of NAFTA’s impact aimed to inform decisions about 
further liberalization, based on the assumption that NAFTA would remain intact. This 
study is the first to review the economic and geostrategic evidence to help from the angle 
of determining whether NAFTA should be preserved at all. 
 
Since NAFTA was ratified, U.S.-Mexico trade—excluding services and petroleum, which 
are not addressed by NAFTA—has grown three and a half times faster than U.S. GDP. The 
United States ran a small trade surplus with Mexico in 1993; today, the U.S.-Mexico trade 
deficit is America’s second largest. If NAFTA were solely responsible for all that trade, it 
might appear that renegotiating it to obtain more favorable terms for the United States 
would have big payoffs, and that repealing it might improve the U.S. deficit.  
 
However, the economic evidence shows that the tariff reductions included in NAFTA did 
not cause major changes to trade. At best, 25% of current U.S.-Mexico trade is due to 
NAFTA tariff reductions. Of course, at $125 billion, that is still a substantial sum. Indeed, for 
segments of certain industries—mostly in agriculture, electronics, and autos—or for 
particular localities like Texas, adjusting NAFTA tariffs could have a substantive impact. 
Importantly, though, every study done on the topic has found that NAFTA boosted U.S. 
exports more than Mexico’s. Hence, as a means for the United States to raise aggregate 
GDP, boost manufacturing employment, or address the trade deficit, renegotiating NAFTA 
holds little potential. 
 
The biggest impacts of NAFTA appear to be the hardest to measure. NAFTA locked in 
reforms in Mexico that had been in process since the 1980s and included tariff reductions 
and investment climate improvements. Once NAFTA reduced the risk of liberalization 
being reversed, firms were more willing to invest in order to take advantage of cross-
border opportunities. As a result, Mexico has become a manufacturing hub for firms across 
the globe looking to sell into the U.S. market. Now that Mexico is a familiar location for 
many multinational firms, its attractiveness to investors no longer depends on NAFTA. 
 
Another important impact of NAFTA derives from the trust dividend that it has produced 
among all three nations—Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Greater trust has enabled 
the U.S. to pursue its political, diplomatic, and security interests in its own neighborhood 
with considerably less resistance than before NAFTA. By consolidating Mexico’s economic 
position as being complementary to that of Canada and the U.S., and by adding 
momentum to continue Mexico’s move toward a full democracy, the treaty helped align 
Mexico’s interests with those of the U.S. and Canada, as opposed to Latin America. Mexico 
has been increasingly open to collaboration with the U.S. on security issues, especially 
undocumented migration and organized crime.  
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This last impact of NAFTA is arguably the most at risk of reversal in the process of 
reexamining the future of NAFTA. Mexico sits on the cusp of a political turning point, and 
NAFTA is even more politically fraught in Mexico than in the United States. As the U.S., 
Mexico, and Canada enter into negotiations over revising NAFTA, the United States should 
tread carefully. There is room for win-win improvements in the treaty, the details of which 
lie outside the scope of this paper. However, the gains achievable even through a radical 
revision of NAFTA are not large.	
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Introduction 
 
With the United States, Mexico, and Canada preparing to reenter negotiations, the door has 
been thrown wide open on the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
the largest U.S. trade agreement by share of U.S. trade. The U.S. needs to know what is at 
stake when considering its bargaining positions. Yet after 23 years of free trade in North 
America, debate remains about NAFTA’s impact on the U.S. In fact, perhaps because of its 
historical significance, no existing trade agreement has received more scrutiny. From its 
inception, NAFTA was heavily criticized as unfavorable to American workers. Others saw it 
as harmful to Mexico. They feared small and medium-sized businesses, especially in 
agriculture, could not compete, and that multinationals would abuse more lax standards in 
Mexico for labor, the environment, and governance. 
 
This policy paper focuses on the impact of NAFTA in the U.S., asking whether the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Our assessment is that this is a very difficult question to answer with 
any certainty. Anyone stating that NAFTA was definitively good or bad is looking at only 
part of the evidence. Research on NAFTA abounds with suggestive findings, but most of it 
has very little power to detect the impact accurately. Just as it would be difficult to measure 
the propulsion of a propeller during a storm, the 1994 peso crisis, pre-NAFTA 
liberalization, the ascension of the Chinese export engine, post-9/11 border measures, and 
many other factors distort the readings we have on the impact of NAFTA. 
 
NAFTA, for most practical purposes, only changed policy for U.S.-Mexico trade. There was 
not much room for NAFTA to improve on the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989, 
and trade between Canada and Mexico remains small.1 According to the Congressional 
Research Service, “at the time that NAFTA went into effect, about 40% of U.S. imports from 
Mexico entered duty-free and the remainder faced duties of up to 35%, with a trade-
weighted average rate of about 7%. Mexico’s trade-weighted tariff on U.S. agricultural 
products averaged about 11%” (Villareal and Fergusson 2015, 5). Most of these tariffs and 
most nontariff barriers were gradually eliminated by 2008. For this reason, the paper 
focuses on the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship. 
 
Three important points have come to light from the trade debate that received far too little 
notice, and the experience of NAFTA speaks to each. First, a small net number can disguise 
large gross impacts. Second, cross-border supply chains make trade symbiotic rather than 
competitive in nature. Third, unexpected effects can and do arise that upend earlier 
forecasts of the treaty’s impact.  
 
We review the evidence at the macro-level on trade and investment flows, which have 
implications for aggregate GDP. We also examine the micro-level of specific industries and 
labor markets, which impacts income distribution. NAFTA further influenced Mexico in 
ways that feed back into the U.S., so we discuss the evidence on migration and Mexico’s 
political system. Both have important implications for critical areas of Mexico’s broader 
relationship with the United States. 
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1. Trade, Investment, and Growth 
 
Macroeconomic implications of NAFTA typically center on the impact on trade and GDP. 
Investment flows are another important macroeconomic factor that trade agreements can 
shape both by liberalizing investment and by reducing the risk of cross-border 
transactions. By shaping investment flows, agreements change trade and employment 
patterns, so the investment impact deserves attention despite being more difficult to pin 
down. 
 
Trade Volumes 
Regarding impact on trade, most descriptions of NAFTA begin by citing the huge increase 
in bilateral trade between the United States, Canada, and Mexico since 1993. There are 
several problems with attributing any significance to these statistics.  
 
First, trade volumes ballooned all around the world during that time—not just among 
NAFTA countries—growing much faster than GDP. Trade between NAFTA countries grew 
faster than the NAFTA countries’ trade with other countries (see Figure 1). Standard trade 
models expect that pattern, not because of NAFTA, but because its members are 
geographically closer to each other than any other trading partners. Trade is typically 
facilitated by lower transportation costs and greater familiarity (Lederman, Maloney, and 
Serven 2005). Interestingly, Figure 1 shows most of Mexico’s gains in U.S. trade share 
stalled after 2000. 
 
Figure 1. Mexico Share of Total U.S. Exports and Imports 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products.  
Sources: UN Comtrade and authors’ calculations. 
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Adding to the rising trend in global trade has been a global upswelling of supply chain 
trade. North-south supply chains expanded as they became much more practical in the 
1990s. Security concerns declined in low-wage countries in the post-Cold War era, 
transportation costs fell rapidly, and improvements in communications and information 
technology facilitated management of extensive cross-border supplier networks. The main 
point is that supply chain trade expanded in Europe, Asia, and North America in the post-
NAFTA period mostly in response to factors other than trade policy changes. 
 
That is not to say NAFTA had no effect on supply chain trade. One of the few studies on 
the impact of NAFTA on trade that incorporates supply chains found much higher impacts 
from NAFTA than previous studies (Caliendo and Parro 2015). In that study, supply chains 
accounted for 25% of NAFTA’s impact on Mexico’s imports and 33% of NAFTA’s impact on 
U.S. imports.2  
 
Trade in intermediate goods (goods meant to feed into the production of a final good) is a 
commonly used measure of cross-border supply chain integration.3 Typically, advanced 
economies send components to emerging economies for finishing (Baldwin 2013). Indeed, 
73% of U.S. exports to Mexico consist of intermediate goods (Figure 2). Adding in goods that 
are commonly used for both intermediate and final consumption purposes—e.g., personal 
computers—the share rises to 77%. 
 
Figure 2. Intermediate Goods as a Share 
of U.S. Exports to Mexico, 1991–2016 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Intermediate Goods as a Share 
of Mexico Exports to the U.S., 1991–2016 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral 
Trade Database by Industry and End-Use classification of 6-digit HS92 codes, applied to UN Comtrade data.  
Sources: OECD Bilateral Trade Database, UN Comtrade. 
 
 
The share of intermediate goods imported from Mexico is lower, at 40% (Figure 3). 
Combining that with mixed-use goods raises the share to 55%. This is a remarkably high 
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While supply chain trade may be an important channel for NAFTA’s impact on the trade 
and the economy, it would be hard to argue that NAFTA disproportionately enabled the 
development of supply chain trade itself. The supply chain measure displayed in Figure 2 
and Figure 3—the share of intermediate goods in total trade—shows no increase in the 
share of supply chain trade after NAFTA’s enactment. If anything, non-supply chain trade 
grew faster. 
 
Second, Mexico had undergone significant liberalization prior to NAFTA, and both 
countries had been lowering tariffs (McDaniel and Agama 2003). Indeed, the trend in U.S. 
tariffs indicates that Mexico experienced a faster decline in tariff preference in the U.S. 
before NAFTA than after (Figure 4). The largest drops in Mexican tariff preference—
preferential treatment for Mexican goods relative to goods from other economies—
occurred from 1991 to 1995. While NAFTA tariff reductions continued to be phased in until 
2009, reductions in tariffs for non-NAFTA countries beginning in 1995 approximately 
matched NAFTA reductions.4 
 
Figure 4. U.S. Tariffs for Mexico, Canada, and Non-NAFTA Partners 
 
 
 
Source: McDaniel and Agama 2003. 
 
 
Complementing the tariff evidence, Zylkin (2016) finds that including the general trend of 
U.S.-Mexico trade from 1990 in their econometric study greatly diminishes the measurable 
impact of NAFTA on trade. Zylkin’s interpretation is that reforms in Mexico were already 
propelling the bilateral trade relationship forward, which NAFTA mostly served to lock in 
and supplement. 
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Third, trade statistics involve double counting whenever trade involves significant amounts 
of intermediate goods.5 Trade statistics capture the full value of the traded good, not just 
the value added by the exporting country. If production took place in more than one 
country, double counting occurs (Koopman et al. 2010). Hence, supply chain trade inflates 
trade volumes without inherently changing the amount of final goods consumed.  
 
Fourth, trade agreements may simply shift trade away from other countries toward 
member countries that now have lower barriers. This is not a net creation of trade, but 
rather what economists call trade diversion. The econometric evidence on NAFTA is 
mixed, with the strongest evidence of diversion occurring in the apparel sector discussed in 
Section 2 (Lederman, Maloney, and Serven 2005). It is possible that growing trade among 
NAFTA members did not imply total trade growth across all U.S. trade partners. 
 
To measure the impact of NAFTA, we need a way to disentangle these other trends. Many 
studies have tried to do this—and many counterintuitively found no NAFTA effect on 
trade. The three most recent studies represent advances in methodology that stand out 
above the rest, and they find a modest positive impact of NAFTA on trade.6  
 
The first two studies apply modern general equilibrium models. Romalis (2007) looks at 
data through 1999 and finds 10% of U.S.-Mexico trade in that year can be attributed to 
NAFTA. Caliendo and Parro (2015) find stronger effects looking at data through 2005. They 
attribute 41% of U.S. exports to Mexico to NAFTA, and 26% of U.S. imports from Mexico. 
The big increase in their results derives from a model that fully incorporates intermediate 
goods in supply chains. With supply chains, a tariff applied to an early-stage import 
cascades through further production stages. Finally, a working paper by Zylkin (2016) 
applies the workhorse gravity model, but with recently developed improvements. His 
results attribute 19% of U.S. exports to Mexico through 2002 to NAFTA, and 4% of trade in 
the other direction. 
 
To summarize across a range of estimates, it is reasonable to say that NAFTA may be 
responsible for roughly 25% of U.S.-Mexico trade. This is substantial, but far less than most 
casual discussions of NAFTA would imply.  
 
Notably, for the studies reported here and other studies, if the researchers found an effect 
of NAFTA, universally the effect was much larger for U.S. exports than for Mexico’s 
exports. These results suggest that other factors like the exchange rate, economic growth, 
and pressure on firms to establish cross-border supply chains deserve the preponderance 
of credit for U.S.-Mexico trade growth, but especially for the growth of Mexico’s exports. 
This has important implications for the next section on trade deficits.  
 
Trade Deficits 
Related to a discussion of trade volumes is a discussion of trade deficits. Critics rightly point 
to the shift in competitiveness in favor of Mexico following NAFTA. Prices of U.S. imports 
from Mexico fell significantly more after NAFTA than prices of U.S. imports of similar goods 
from non-NAFTA countries—much more, in fact, than the fall in tariffs. This suggests closer 
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economic integration with the U.S. allowed Mexico’s exporters “to achieve cost-reducing 
economies of scale by improving the suitability of their products for the U.S. market, thereby 
increasing export volumes” (Rimmer and Dixon 2015, 4). The bottom line is that NAFTA 
improved Mexico’s competitiveness beyond the direct impact of tariff reductions. It also 
impacted Mexico beneficially on other scores, which will be discussed below. 
 
Another key element of a bilateral trade deficit, however, is demand. During the NAFTA 
period, Mexican demand for U.S. goods was decimated from the start by the peso crisis in 
December 1994, while U.S. demand for Mexican goods remained strong. This can be seen in 
Figure 5 in the one-time large drop in the trade balance in 1995.7 The dollar has since 
appreciated further, going from MX$13 to a dollar in 2014 to MX$22 to a dollar in early 2017, 
fueling greater demand for Mexican goods in the U.S. and depressing demand for U.S. goods 
in Mexico. The peso has since strengthened, but it remains around MX$18.50 to a dollar.  
Moreover, for various reasons, including the deepening linkages between the two 
economies, the Mexican economy has not grown much faster than the U.S. economy, and 
consequently, there has been no opportunity to re-equilibrate relative demand. As a result, 
the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico has remained fairly constant and close to zero, dropping 
by only 0.2% of GDP across the next 20 years. Studies have been able to identify virtually 
no impact of NAFTA on the bilateral trade deficit (Congressional Budget Office 2016). 	
Figure 5. U.S.-Mexico Trade as a Share of U.S. GDP	
 
  
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. 
Sources: UN Comtrade and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Overall, the econometric evidence in the previous section indicates the forces on the trade 
deficit that are attributable to NAFTA pushed more in favor of the U.S. This makes sense, 
considering Mexico made bigger tariff reductions than the U.S. The shift of the trade 
deficit against the U.S. after NAFTA appears to be driven by coincident non-NAFTA factors 
like the peso crisis, relative economic growth, and competitive pressure to develop north-
south supply chains. 
 
If NAFTA is responsible for roughly 25% of total U.S.-Mexico trade, that amounts to $133 
billion or 0.7% of GDP. The evidence discussed above suggests that NAFTA boosted U.S. 
exports more than Mexico’s—but, ignoring that, a back-of-the-envelope scenario 
demonstrates that if NAFTA reduced the U.S.-Mexico trade deficit by 25%, that would be 
$15 billion, or a reduction of the total U.S. trade deficit by 0.1% of GDP. Therefore, even 
assuming NAFTA could reduce the bilateral deficit proportionally to its rough impact on 
bilateral trade, it would make almost no difference on the aggregate U.S. trade deficit. 
 
Figure 6. NAFTA Trade Volumes in Context, 2015	
 
	  
*Assumes NAFTA is responsible for 25% of U.S.-Mexico trade. 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products.  
Sources: FRED, UN Comtrade, and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Investment Flows 
Cross-border investment benefited from NAFTA in several ways. Most directly, the 
Mexican government agreed to allow investment in certain fields that had previously been 
precluded, like banking and retail trade. By reducing tariffs on imports into the U.S., 
NAFTA made it more profitable to relocate to Mexico and sell to the U.S. 
17,947	
970	
501	
125	 66	
0	
5,000	
10,000	
15,000	
U.S.	GDP	 U.S.	Global	Trade	
Deﬁcit	
U.S.-Mexico	Trade	
(Exports	+	Imports)	
U.S.-Mexico	Trade	
Due	to	NAFTA*	
U.S.-Mexico	Trade	
Deﬁcit	
Bi
lli
on
s	
Was NAFTA Good for the United States? 
	 11 
Perhaps most importantly, NAFTA reduced the risk of investment. It included provisions 
for basic protections for foreign investors, provided a mechanism for investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS), and provided for “non-discriminatory treatment” for foreign investment 
in certain sectors. It included protection of intellectual property, which allows a firm to 
develop a supply chain with affiliates without risk of theft of proprietary technology.  
 
Also, locking in earlier Mexican liberalizations and eliminating the discretion to increase 
barriers to trade or investment in the future—by the U.S. or Mexico—reduced investment 
risk. Country risk in Mexico is rooted primarily in domestic variables, including low public 
revenue, weaknesses in its infrastructure and education systems, corruption, and high 
crime rates, while its strengths are directly derived from membership in NAFTA as well as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G-20, and the 
Pacific Alliance, all of which give foreign investment a high degree of predictability. 
Both of these factors—lower trade barriers and a more supportive investment 
environment—benefited investment in Mexico by firms from third countries just as much 
as by firms from the U.S. or Canada. Indeed, a good share of the competition U.S. 
manufacturers faced from Mexico was not from U.S. firms that moved south. Rather, the 
largest share of foreign direct investment (FDI) due to NAFTA reflected investment by 
third-party countries, whose manufacturers saw advantages to re-locating inside the 
NAFTA area (Adams et al. 2003). This effect has been amplified since NAFTA by Mexico 
signing free trade agreements with more countries. It now has agreements with 45 
countries compared to 20 in the United States. 
 
NAFTA therefore deserves credit for 25–30% of the doubling in cross-border investment 
into Mexico through 1999 (Cuevas, Messmacher, and Werner 2005). Nonetheless, the 
magnitude of cross-border flows remains much smaller than the public imagines. To put it 
in perspective, U.S. domestic gross capital formation remained over 300 times larger than 
U.S. FDI into Mexico at its peak before the global financial crisis of 2008–9 (Figure 7). 
From Mexico’s viewpoint, however, cross-border flows are large, representing an average 
of one-third of all incoming FDI in the post-NAFTA period. 
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Figure 7. Metrics of U.S. FDI into Mexico, Three-year Moving Average 
 
  
 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Monetary Fund, and authors’ calculations. 
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Partly, this relates to the fact that U.S.-Mexico trade was small compared to the overall U.S. 
economy to begin with; exports plus imports were 1.4% of GDP in 1994. By 2015, it was 3.0% 
of GDP (Figure 6). On the other hand, for every dollar of trade in 1993, NAFTA generated 
50 cents of GDP gain. While this comparison is an awkward mix of economic concepts, it is 
suggestive that NAFTA delivered an impressively high return.8 
 
2. Industry-level Impact 
 
The industries with the largest presence in bilateral U.S.-Mexican trade can be seen in 
Figures 8 and 9. Transportation, electronics, and machinery flow in large quantities in both 
directions, although the U.S. imports a higher share of these goods than it exports. The U.S. 
dominates in chemicals and plastics, which have expanded in the NAFTA period.9 There are 
many ways to measure NAFTA’s impact on specific industries. Caliendo and Parro (2015) 
compare growth of exports to Mexico against U.S. exports to the entire world. They find 
NAFTA promoted a higher growth of U.S. electronics exports and less growth of chemicals.  
 
Agriculture represents a surprisingly small share of Mexican exports in the graphs below, lower 
than before NAFTA. This does not indicate that Mexico’s agricultural exports have declined, 
but rather that other export categories grew faster. U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico have 
increased across the NAFTA period, and Mexico is now the third-largest export market for U.S. 
agricultural goods. Apparel and textiles is a shrinking share of both countries’ exports. 
 
Figure 8. Share of Mexico Exports to the U.S. by Product, 1992–2016 
 
  
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products.  
Source: UN Comtrade, HS92. 
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Figure 9. Share of U.S. Exports to Mexico by Product, 1992–2016 
 
  
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products.  
Source: UN Comtrade, HS92. 
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Figure 10. Share of Mexico Intermediate Goods Exports to the U.S. by Product, 1992–2016 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD 
Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-Use classification of 6-digit HS92 codes, applied to UN Comtrade data. 
Sources: OECD Bilateral Trade Database, UN Comtrade. 
 
 
Figure 11. Share of U.S. Intermediate Goods Exports to Mexico by Product, 1992–2016 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral 
Trade Database by Industry and End-Use classification of 6-digit HS92 codes, applied to UN Comtrade data. 
Sources: OECD Bilateral Trade Database, UN Comtrade. 
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However, electronics has fallen as a share of intermediate goods trade in both directions 
since NAFTA (the auto sector is discussed in more detail below). Industries like chemicals 
and machinery that typically supply parts for other industries have grown faster than 
electronics. Because intermediate goods may be used in a number of other industries, this 
data only describes the upstream industries participating in supply chains, not downstream 
final-goods industries in the chain. 
 
Trade liberalization under NAFTA disproportionately impacted three industries: autos, 
agriculture, and textiles/apparel (USITC 2003).11 Autos and textiles/apparel faced higher 
than average tariffs before NAFTA; the U.S. imposed quantitative restrictions on textiles 
and apparel; and agriculture faced restrictive non-tariff barriers like import license 
requirements by Mexico. As a result, these three industries deserve special focus. Each 
section below tells a different story about how NAFTA played out for the U.S., and as such 
they serve as vignettes documenting the complexity of such broad economic relationships. 
 
Autos 
The auto industry experience with NAFTA epitomizes the gains available from lowering 
trade barriers. This stems from the fact that transportation equipment is second only to 
electronics as the most trade-intensive industry in the world (Baldwin 2013).  
 
This sector is often described as seamlessly integrated across North America. Producing a 
car is much more likely to involve trading parts across borders now than before the treaty 
(Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder 2001). This is illustrated in Figures 8 through 11, 
which show that transportation’s share of U.S.-Mexico trade in both directions has grown 
since NAFTA began. Vehicles and auto parts dominate the transportation category.  
 
Of course, attributing causality to NAFTA for any of these trends—especially more recent 
ones—risks misreading the evidence, but they are at least consistent with the possibility 
of causality. 
 
From 1993 to 2014, U.S. exports of vehicles and auto parts to the world have increased by 
166%, keeping its share of global exports close to constant.12 Growth in U.S. auto part 
exports to the rest of the world greatly exceeded the growth of exports to Mexico and 
Canada (Rimmer and Dixon 2015). Hence, the United States appears to have preserved its 
global competitiveness, even if it has lost some market share in the NAFTA region. On the 
other hand, exports of truck and bus bodies and metal-forming machinery saw greater 
growth in NAFTA countries than the rest of the world.  
 
These figures include the many other factors impacting competitiveness across this period, 
such as the shift in U.S. production to less unionized states, improved production 
techniques, or lower relative energy costs. However, the degree of industry reorganization 
to take advantage of regional networks—which continues to the present—suggests that 
integration benefited the competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry (Klein, Schuh, and 
Triest 2002; Hufbauer and Schott 2005).  
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The impact of NAFTA on autoworkers is harder to determine. Researchers at the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics observe that at the same time U.S. auto production 
was rising, employment levels in the auto industry fell by one-third from 1994 to 2013. 
Mexican autoworker employment levels quadrupled (Hufbauer, Cimino, and Moran 2014). 
On top of this, U.S. autoworker wages did not climb with the obvious increase in their 
productivity, as economic theory suggests it should, all else equal.  
 
Again, it is difficult to isolate NAFTA from other forces at work. Hufbauer, Cimino, and 
Moran note the decline in union membership as U.S. production volumes shifted to 
factories in the southern U.S., as well as the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on U.S. 
auto manufacturers. Auto exports from South Korea, where wages are also lower than in 
the United States, grew twice as fast as Mexico’s during this period.13 After controlling for 
some of these factors, Klein, Schuh, and Triest (2002) do not find a difference between 
employment trends before and after NAFTA. To the extent that NAFTA mattered for the 
U.S. auto sector, rather than accelerating job loss, it probably helped keep wages down. 
 
In sum, NAFTA’s effect on the U.S. auto industry is complex. Many argue that the 
efficiencies achieved through greater integration helped sustain the North American auto 
industry, which might have otherwise succumbed to competitors. 
 
Agriculture 
The U.S., in using more efficient production methods, has been a clear winner from 
NAFTA’s lower barriers to agricultural goods (Zylkin 2016). While agriculture’s share of 
exports to Mexico declined in the NAFTA period (Figure 9), it fell a bit more slowly than 
agriculture’s share of exports to the rest of the world. Slicing the data in a slightly different 
way, Mexico’s share of all U.S. agricultural exports rose 9% in the NAFTA period (Figure 12). 
A review of econometric studies indicates a significant portion of that increase is due to the 
reduction in tariffs and nontariff barriers embodied in NAFTA (Zahniser et al. 2015).  
 
Figure 12. Share of Total U.S. Agricultural Exports Going to Mexico 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. Source: UN Comtrade, HS92. 
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Row crops like corn exemplify the increases in U.S. exports. Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Hegerty (2011) find that NAFTA shifted the balance of trade in animal feed (i.e., corn) in 
favor of the U.S.14  
 
U.S. agricultural success has not been lost on Mexico, where NAFTA is unpopular for the 
exact opposite reason—presumably wreaking havoc on Mexico’s agricultural industry. 
However, Susanto, Rosson, and Adcock (2007) find that NAFTA contributed to a significant 
increase in U.S. imports of Mexican agricultural goods as well. This benefits U.S. consumers 
with greater variety and seasonal availability of food. 
 
With only 2% of the U.S. workforce in agriculture, and agricultural workers not typically 
earning high wages, any job losses due to NAFTA have largely not been painful. Zahniser et 
al. (2015) estimate that the number of U.S. jobs supported by U.S. agricultural exports to 
Canada and Mexico has increased during the NAFTA period, but the net job impact is 
negligible. Hence, it can be said that NAFTA had almost entirely beneficial outcomes for 
U.S. agriculture. Again, the picture in Mexico is much more complex, a topic well covered 
in other papers.15 
 
Textiles and Apparel 
The textile and apparel industry tells another type of story, one of an unexpected 
development that takes over the plot. To set the context, NAFTA gradually eliminated 
duties on textiles and apparel over 10 years. It mildly accentuated the long-term decline of 
the U.S. apparel industry, but the U.S. was still the lowest-cost producer of textiles, which 
are more easily automated than apparel (Lederman, Maloney, and Serven 2005). U.S. 
exports of cotton and textiles to Mexico grew, as shown in Figure 9, quadrupling the U.S. 
trade surplus in textiles through 2001 (USITC 2003). Mexican textile and apparel exports to 
the U.S.—especially apparel exports, as shown in Figure 8—also grew faster than other 
products, aided by removal by the U.S. of quantitative restrictions in addition to lower 
tariffs (USITC 2003; Zahniser et al. 2015). However, Mexican apparel export gains likely 
came at the expense of Asian producers, not U.S. producers, so the impact on total U.S. 
imports was muted (Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder 2001; Klein, Schuh, and Triest 
2002; Fukao, Okubo, and Stern 2003). This netted a shift in the textiles trade balance in 
favor of the U.S., which Bahmani-Oskooee and Hegerty (2011) attribute directly to NAFTA. 
 
NAFTA was subsequently rendered meaningless to the textile and apparel sector by the 
surprise entry of other competitors. China, Vietnam, and other countries gained access to 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2000, the 
same year the United States granted duty- and quota-free access to U.S. markets for the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative countries via the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act 
(CBTPA). Mexican apparel and textile producers could no longer dominate the relationship 
with the U.S. As a result, the share of textiles in bilateral U.S.-Mexico trade began to fall in 
2000 (Zahniser et al. 2015). Nonetheless, in 2015, Mexico and the CBTPA countries remain 
the largest export markets for the U.S. textiles industry, accounting for 74% of total U.S. 
textile exports (USITC 2016, 58). 
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3. Labor Markets and Inequality 
 
Without a doubt, the impact of NAFTA on U.S. labor markets is the number one concern of 
American policymakers. Opponents tout large job losses (e.g., Scott 2011), and supporters 
point to large job gains (e.g., Hufbauer, Cimino, and Moran 2014). Both sides attribute all 
changes in bilateral trade since NAFTA began to the agreement. As described in Section 1, 
this is a mistake. 
 
Numerous studies have more carefully measured the impact of NAFTA on U.S. labor 
markets after controlling for other potential influences. Some find negative net impacts 
(Hornbeck 2004; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Hakobyan and McLaren 2016) and some 
find positive net impacts (Francis and Zheng 2011; De La Cruz and Riker 2014; Caliendo 
and Parro 2015). All find that the impact was probably quite small, commensurate with the 
small net impact on GDP.  
However, as the industry-level analysis in Section 2 indicates, aggregate numbers can 
disguise large and meaningful offsetting gains and losses, which deserve careful 
consideration. For instance, Klein, Schuh, and Triest (2002) document that U.S. 
employment in textiles fell after NAFTA despite the fact that the industry’s exports did not 
decrease. The producers that succeeded in the more competitive environment were the 
more productive ones that required fewer workers. On the other hand, Klein, Schuh, and 
Triest see little impact on employment in the chemical and auto sectors. 
 
The most careful work isolating the impact of NAFTA on local labor markets and specific 
industries in the United States is Hakobyan and McLaren (2016). The study identified the 
U.S. regions most vulnerable to competition from Mexico: Pennsylvania and the Deep 
South, especially Alabama, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Tennessee. Their conclusion is 
worth quoting: 
For the most heavily NAFTA-vulnerable locations, a high school dropout would 
have up to 8 percentage points slower wage growth from 1990 to 2000…There is, 
however, an even larger industry effect, with wage growth in the most protected 
industries that lose their protection quickly falling 17 percentage points relative to 
industries that were unprotected to begin with. (Hakobyan and McLaren 2016, 729) 
 
Wage growth for the median American worker grew 40% (3.4% per year) from 1990 to 
2000, according to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey. 
Knocking 8 to 17 percentage points off that growth—or a combined 25 percentage points 
for a high school dropout in the most protected industry—represents a meaningful impact 
of NAFTA. Hakobyan and McLaren found no impact on college-educated workers.16  
 
The disproportionate impact on low-skilled workers provides the strongest counter-
argument to the substantial evidence that the jobs created through trade pay better wages 
than the jobs that are lost. The workers who gain jobs due to NAFTA are not the same workers that 
lose jobs due to NAFTA. The better-paying jobs often are in different locations with 
insuperable moving costs, or they require higher skill sets. Further, while De La Cruz and 
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Riker (2014) find a small positive impact from NAFTA on the real wages of both skilled and 
unskilled workers, the impact on skilled workers was greater. This all suggests that NAFTA 
had a small negative impact on income inequality. 
 
Dani Rodrik has often made the point that trade deals have much greater (five times or 
more) negative redistributive effects than the positive gains attained through greater 
output (e.g., Rodrik 1992). For NAFTA, the magnitude of any impact on income inequality 
is difficult to measure. In the case of the Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) study, income 
growth for the median worker who did not finish high school slowed by 4% over a decade 
due to NAFTA, but workers with a high school diploma or better saw no effect. In 1996, 
about 11% of the labor force had not completed high school. If the net increase in GDP was 
just under 1%, this places the redistributive impact in the same range as the positive gains.17 
 
The dramatic rise in China’s share of global exports played a role in reducing the beneficial 
impact of NAFTA on U.S. labor markets. One anticipated source of wage and employment 
growth for the United States was the convergence of labor markets in Mexico toward the 
U.S. Rising productivity in Mexico and the tightening of Mexican labor markets due to 
trade-linked labor demand both should have put upward pressure on Mexican wages. In 
response, U.S. workers should have gained bargaining power and exporters should have 
gained a larger market for their products. 
 
As it happened, Mexican wage levels have not risen. Instead, after China obtained WTO 
membership, Mexico found itself struggling against imports of many of the same goods it 
produces. This limited the growth of Mexican exports to the U.S., with collateral impacts 
on Mexican labor markets (Hanson 2010). The China effect diminished the potential 
benefits of NAFTA, but not due to any problem inherent in the treaty itself. 
 
4. Regional Economic Impacts 
 
The trade relationship with Mexico is not uniform across all parts of the United States. In 
fact, it is concentrated in six states—the three biggest border states and three major 
Midwestern manufacturing states (Figure 13). Any changes to U.S.-Mexico trade would 
impact these states more than any other part of the country.  
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Figure 13. State Shares of U.S. Trade with Mexico, 2016 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products.  
Source: Authors’ calculation using U.S. Census origin of movement data. 
 
Texas stands out as having by far the deepest economic relationship with Mexico. Texas 
exports to Mexico amounted to more than $92 billion in 2016, of which $14 billion was 
petroleum products. Non-petroleum goods exports to Mexico constitute 43% of global non-
petroleum goods exports from Texas. It also represents 38% of all U.S. non-petroleum 
goods exports to Mexico. To put that in context, Texas has less than 10% of the U.S. 
population and about 10% of U.S. GDP, so Mexico trade is highly concentrated in that one 
state. Although Arizona is a smaller state, it has almost the same exposure to Mexico as 
Texas, as exports to Mexico represent 38% of its global exports. 
 
The same six states dominate imports from Mexico, but Texas is less of an outlier with 27% 
of the national total, while Michigan and California have 17% and 16%, respectively. 
 
Not surprisingly, the industry breakdown of trade from Mexico varies by state. In fact, 
what may be more surprising is how similar the export industry pattern is across states. 
The import pattern exhibits more variation. 
 
Focusing on the leading six states in Figures 14 and 15, the importance of auto 
manufacturing for Michigan and Ohio stands out. Texas, California, and Arizona specialize 
more heavily in electronics (on the import side, California’s massive imports of finished 
vehicles squeeze out the other sectors). Agricultural exports are a smaller share of the 
leading six states than the rest of the country.  
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Figure 14. State Exports to Mexico by Industry, 2016 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. States are listed in descending order of their share of 
total U.S. exports to Mexico. Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral Trade Database by 
Industry and End-Use classification of 6-digit HS codes, applied to U.S. Census Bureau origin of movement data.  
Source: OECD Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
 
Figure 15. State Imports from Mexico by Industry, 2016 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. States are listed in descending order of their share of 
total U.S. exports to Mexico. Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral Trade Database by 
Industry and End-Use classification of 6-digit HS codes, applied to U.S. Census Bureau state of destination data.  
Source: OECD Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Trade can also be parsed by end use, divided between capital goods used to produce other 
goods, intermediate goods serving as inputs to production, and final goods for household 
consumption. To avoid ambiguity, the OECD also identifies mixed-use goods that 
commonly fall in more than one category. 
 
Intermediate goods can serve as a proxy for supply chain trade, as discussed in Section 2. 
Overall, this category dominates U.S. exports to Mexico (Figure 16). Supply chains tend to 
be clustered close to the border, though the effect in the United States is not great (Hanson 
1998). This may mean border states like Texas host a disproportionate amount of supply 
chain linkages to Mexico.  
 
Figure 16. State Exports to Mexico by End Use, 2016 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. States are listed in descending order of their share of 
total U.S. exports to Mexico. Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral Trade Database by 
Industry and End-Use classification of 6-digit HS codes, applied to U.S. Census Bureau origin of movement data.  
Sources: OECD Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Figure 17. State Imports from Mexico by End Use, 2016 
 
 
 
Note: Trade data exclude services and petroleum products. States are listed in descending order of their share of 
total U.S. exports to Mexico. Intermediate goods are identified using the OECD Bilateral Trade Database by 
Industry and End-Use classification of 6-digit HS codes, applied to U.S. Census Bureau state of destination data.  
Sources: OECD Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
In the data, however, the pattern for Texas looks about average. It should be no surprise that 
the figure for Texas approximates the national average, given its overwhelming share of 
U.S.-Mexico trade, but in fact, the national average hardly changes when removing Texas. 
 
The share of intermediate goods trade for the manufacturing states of Michigan and Ohio 
unsurprisingly suggests higher than average linkages. More surprisingly, so does Arizona. 
Illustrative of supply chain linkages, much of Ohio’s intermediate goods imports supply its 
automotive industry with items like engine parts and wiring sets.18 It is worth noting that 
soybeans and corn also rank highly among intermediate goods exports from Illinois and Ohio. 
 
California stands as an outlier from the national pattern, with a significantly lower share of 
intermediate goods exports and imports (Figure 17). This implies less reliance on Mexico 
supply chains, perhaps because of the strength of the relationships between California’s 
industries and Asia. 
 
How much did NAFTA contribute to the state-level patterns of overall and supply chain 
trade with Mexico described above? Coughlin and Wall (2003) find that after controlling 
for state-level economic growth rates, among the six leading states NAFTA only boosted 
exports to Mexico from the border states of Arizona, California, and Texas. However, 
Texas saw a surprisingly small impact; NAFTA boosted exports, but less than for the 
average state in the Southeast U.S. (Funk et al. 2006).  
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Some states lost business due to NAFTA, and some of the gains represented shifts between 
states. New York and Minnesota were found to have experienced substantial export declines 
due to NAFTA (Coughlin and Wall 2003). The electrical equipment and automotive 
industries saw export activity move from states like Louisiana to Texas and Tennessee (Funk 
et al. 2006). Electrical equipment and automotive are the two industries that most strongly 
developed cross-border supply chains, both around the world and within NAFTA. Relatedly, 
Coughlin and Wall show that Texas received a disproportionate lift in exports to Canada, 
perhaps because of Texas’ role in the integration of the auto industry. 
 
One interpretation of this evidence might be that if studies cannot identify a clear, strong 
impact of NAFTA on Texas, it is no surprise that few of the early studies on national trade 
found an impact. However, the two studies cited above and many of the early studies use 
simple gravity models and small samples. It appears most likely that the auto and electrical 
industries in Texas, other border states, and Tennessee saw the most concentrated gains 
from NAFTA. These gains were not enormous, however, accounting for no more than a 
small fraction of overall trade growth during the NAFTA period.  
 
5. Immigration from Mexico to the United States 
 
A substantive discussion has taken place over the last two decades on the impact of NAFTA 
on Mexican migration to the United States. This discussion is merited. One of the original 
promises behind the agreement was that it would help promote Mexico’s economic 
development—by attracting foreign direct investment, creating jobs, increasing wage rates, 
and reducing poverty and inequality—and thereby stem the tide of migration, especially 
undocumented migration, to the United States (Villarreal 2010). Almost 25 years later, the 
empirical evidence related to this promise is mixed, and the relationship between NAFTA 
and undocumented migration is difficult to disentangle from other variables.  
 
There is a broad consensus that NAFTA, for example, had an initial impact on 
undocumented migration through a negative impact on Mexico’s agricultural industry—
particularly small farmers, many of whom moved to the United States without the necessary 
documents (Burfisher, Robison, and Thierfelder 2017). The statistics show that unauthorized 
migration from Mexico rose during the first six years of the agreement, dropped sharply in 
the early 2000s, spiked again in the mid-2000s, and then began dropping dramatically, even 
as NAFTA-induced economic growth in Mexico continued to rise steadily throughout these 
same years (NAFTA’s growth impact is covered in Section 1). Over the last 10 years, in fact, 
Mexican unauthorized migration has fallen to a trickle, and some argue that Mexican 
migration to the United States is now at net zero or even negative (González-Barrera 2015) as 
NAFTA continues to stimulate Mexican economic growth (Figure 18).19 The number of 
unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the U.S. has also dropped steadily over the last 10 years 
(Figure 19). But it is difficult to attribute this to NAFTA, given other key variables that may 
have decreased unauthorized migration to the United States, which include demographic 
changes in Mexico and beefed up border security, in addition to increased foreign 
investment in Mexican industry spurred by NAFTA. 
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Figure 18. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Apprehensions and Documented Migration 
from Mexico, 1990-2015 
 
 
 
Sources: Data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection [a] and U.S. Department of Homeland Security [b]. 
 
 
Figure 19. Undocumented U.S. Residents of Mexican Origin, 1990-2015 
 
 
 
Note: Data are an estimate and average measurements from Pew Research Center for Hispanic Studies and U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. 
Source: Pew Research Center for Hispanic Studies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
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At the aggregate level, undocumented Mexican migration patterns to the United States, as 
shown in Figure 18, appear to bear no correlation with Mexico’s economic growth, foreign 
direct investment, unemployment, or wages, according to OECD data. This suggests that the 
effect of NAFTA on push forces in Mexico and pull forces in the United States is complex. 
The agreement may have had some effect on Mexican migration to the U.S., but not exactly 
what or when it was expected. In any event, Mexican migration to the United States is also 
not easily disentangled from powerful pull forces in the U.S., which tended to attract many 
migrants in the 1990s primarily because of strong economic growth and job creation. 
 
To understand the complex relationship between undocumented Mexican migration and 
NAFTA, it is probably best to zoom in on specific industries. Indeed, a report published in 
2004 showed that while Mexico gained 500,000 manufacturing jobs between 1994 and 
2002, it lost 1.5 million jobs in agriculture due to increasing American imports (Audley et 
al. 2017). If this is the case, NAFTA had in fact the opposite effect of what was expected, 
initially fueling Mexican migration to the U.S. through a collapse of the Mexican 
agricultural sector. By extension, it can be hypothesized that NAFTA-induced migration 
had a negative impact on wage growth at the bottom of the U.S. labor market as migrants 
competed with lower-skilled Americans for the same jobs, although the evidence is mixed 
(Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Clemens, Lewis, and Postel 2017). 
 
Eventually, the negative impacts of NAFTA on Mexico’s agricultural sector appear to have 
played themselves out, and undocumented migration of Mexican farmers dropped. A 
dramatic drop in Mexican fertility rates (Index Mundi 2017) as well as beefed up security 
along the U.S.-Mexico border (Ewing 2014), which has made it increasingly difficult to 
cross between ports of entry, may also be important explanations to the declining 
willingness of Mexicans to move to the United States. But, if we consider that at least 40% of 
all unauthorized residents came to the U.S. with a visa and then overstayed its duration, it is 
clear that Mexicans are still coming to the U.S.—entering ports of entry either without 
authorization, or with a visa and overstaying after it has expired. 
 
Thus, unwittingly, NAFTA may have contributed to undocumented migration rates 
increasing for the first 10 years, but eventually contributed to greater economic 
opportunities in Mexico so that the rate of undocumented migration lost momentum. 
Demographic changes in Mexico and increased border security, however, also made it 
more difficult to cross into the United States without being detected and apprehended. 
 
6. Broader U.S.-Mexico Relations 
 
Not all the impacts of a trade agreement are economic. Some are complex to measure and 
correlate, including the diplomatic, political, and social impacts within and between trading 
nations. This generally stems from credible commitments to reforms, as well as dividends 
built through increased interaction. The literature on the effects of free trade on conflict and 
cooperation is crucial here. Some authors have in fact argued that free trade does drive a 
nation’s foreign policy in the direction of peace and broader cooperation (McDonald 2017). 
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In this regard, NAFTA seems to have reset the U.S.-Mexico relationship after one of its 
lowest points in the mid-1980s, when both countries clashed over drug trafficking and the 
torturing of a DEA agent in Mexico (Smith 1985). By 1989, the two countries had begun to 
take a new approach in their relations, and by the mid-1990s NAFTA appears to have 
solidified Mexico’s commitment to become a market democracy; transformed and 
strengthened the institutional, legal, and civil society capacity within the country; and set in 
motion new forms of political and diplomatic interaction between Mexico and the United 
States (Aspinwall 2009). It also seems to have made Mexico more receptive to U.S. security 
interests. By 2007, Mexico and the United States had achieved unprecedented cooperation 
on security issues through the Merida Initiative, and American law enforcement 
bureaucracies were given historic access to Mexico’s public safety and security system 
between 2007 and 2012 (U.S. Department of State 2017). All of this appears to have been the 
direct result of trust built over time through a partnership partly framed by NAFTA. 
 
7. Political and Social Impacts of NAFTA on Mexico 
 
Between the 1930s and 1970s, Mexico’s economy was based on an import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) model. During this period, the Mexican government was the primary 
engine of economic planning and development. By the late 1970s, however, the ISI model 
was reaching its structural limits (Primo Braga 2010). By 1980, the Mexican economic 
system was in a severe crisis. In response, the government began to implement a series of 
measures that dismantled the ISI model and moved Mexico toward an open economy 
reliant on private and foreign investment, international trade, and strict macroeconomic 
discipline. In 1986, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 
predecessor of the WTO. 
 
Mexico’s economic and commercial opening through the 1980s was a relative success. By 
the late 1980s, the country had turned the corner, and its economy began to stabilize and 
grow again. In 1989, Mexico made the decision to approach the U.S. about entering a free 
trade agreement, with Canada joining the negotiations soon after. By the Mexican 
government’s own recognition, a free trade agreement with the U.S. and Canada would 
represent the culmination of a liberalization process that started in the early 1980s (WTO 
2002). The agreement consolidated Mexico’s new economic model and anchored it in a 
North American context. By most measures, this goal was achieved by 2009, when all the 
provisions of NAFTA were fully implemented. 
 
Another central question, however, is whether NAFTA had any impact on Mexico’s political 
system, and thereby its relationship with the United States (Smith 1992). Free trade would 
presumably contribute to bringing the country more politically in line with Canada and the 
United States and add to the general stability of the NAFTA partners. In effect, Mexico 
redefined itself as a North American country and distanced itself from Latin America.  
 
NAFTA may have indeed propelled the Mexican government to make concessions in terms 
of political openness in 1994 and 1997, although discerning the agreement’s overall causal 
relationship to Mexico’s social and political change is difficult in and of itself (Heredia 
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1994). But Mexico’s political opening after NAFTA did accelerate—as modernization theory 
would predict—and its relationship with the U.S. came to be understood as one where 
Mexico would eventually join the industrialized democracies.  
 
Indeed, NAFTA may have “unleashed a series of processes that clearly would not have 
developed on their own, and yet were not of NAFTA’s creation” (Castañeda 1993) and given 
Mexicans new energy to pursue more liberal social and political actions (Steffan 2007). The 
NAFTA negotiations were in and of themselves a mechanism for the organization of 
Mexican civil society, although sometimes that organization was to protest the agreement 
(Heredia 2010). 
 
Free trade therefore emboldened the Mexican electorate, despite the existence of pockets 
of dissatisfaction with the treaty. The public pushed for further political opening, and the 
long-dominant National Revolutionary Party lost control of the Mexican Congress by 1997 
and the presidency in 2000. Thus, although it is difficult to isolate the triumph of the 
opposition in Mexico from the economic opening that took place in the 1980s—an 
economic opening that was consolidated by a closer relationship with Canada and the U.S. 
through NAFTA—Mexicans did acquire a renewed sense of political empowerment once 
the agreement was in place. 
 
Moreover, Liu and Ornelas (2014) have posited that free trade can help in the consolidation 
of democracy by reducing the incentives of authoritarian groups to seek power, because 
free trade destroys protectionist rents. This is not to say that NAFTA destroyed all rent 
seeking in Mexico, as there is some evidence that the Mexican government did protect 
some monopolies. Indeed, the World Bank has argued that certain business interests (and 
some labor interests) have blocked important changes to make Mexico’s economy more 
efficient, in spite of increasing free trade (Levy and Walton 2009). The Mexican economy, 
however, did become more competitive, and the monopolies that remained—such as that 
in the telecommunications sector—became politically controversial among Mexicans and 
were perceived as remnants of the old economic system. 
 
It is also important to point out what NAFTA has not done for Mexico. Corruption and 
crime have not decreased since the agreement was ratified. If anything, both have 
increased in recent years, fueling Americans’ unease over a close relationship with Mexico. 
Petty corruption costs Mexico billions of dollars, and it has not diminished since NAFTA 
entered into force. Mexico continues to be labeled a largely corrupt nation on most 
international indices (Transparency International 2017). But corruption is an ingrained 
institution in Mexico, going back to colonial times (Oliver 2007). The weakening of the 
central government’s authority after 2000 has not helped. It is unfair to expect a trade 
agreement to surmount the much stronger forces exerted by corruption. 
 
Crime has been on the rise, especially that related to drug trafficking. Ordinary crime—
including rape, extortion, natural resource theft, femicide, and kidnappings—has also 
increased, but it is not at all clear that this is linked to NAFTA. In fact, crime rates have 
fluctuated with no apparent relation to trade or NAFTA (see Figure 20). 
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Figure 20. Crime Statistics in Mexico, 2000-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Mexico National Public Security System (SNSP). There are other sources that may vary 
slightly from the Mexican government’s official numbers, but they all show the same trends. 
 
 
Thus, as Mexico opened its economic system, its political system became increasingly 
democratic as well. The trend was largely propelled by growing interaction with the U.S. 
and Canada, which caused a positive opinion of the U.S. to increase among Mexicans. In 
fact, by 2009, nearly 70% of Mexicans had a positive view of the U.S., a historic high 
(Menasce Horowitz 2013). Thus, it can be argued that Mexico’s aspiration to match U.S. 
political norms can be attributed to its close economic relationship with the U.S., which was 
later further reinforced by free trade and increased economic integration. It is also likely 
that even if NAFTA had never been negotiated, the two economies would have grown 
together over time, and Mexico’s political system would have begun to emulate American 
political norms. 
 
Demonstrating the political and social impacts of trade on a country is a difficult task, but the 
rapid increase in economic interaction between neighbors seems to have enabled Mexico to 
bind itself to certain international standards without having to go through the standard 
legislative process for structural changes to be implemented—in effect, legislating itself from 
outside. This is to say that Mexico, sometimes unable to pass reforms within its own political 
and legislative framework, chose to make international commitments (such as NAFTA)—
which, once signed, became Mexican law. Congress could then only give a yea or nay vote, 
without being able to engage in protracted and difficult domestic negotiations. In fact, until 
recently, a consensus in U.S. foreign policy was that the promotion of economic openness 
abroad generally serves American interests—and Mexico was a good example of this. 	
8. Institutions and International Cooperation 
 
Free trade between nations may have added benefits, such as creating and consolidating 
alliances in areas like security that ultimately result in greater international cooperation. In 
other words, trade agreements have integration effects that reduce strategic political 
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behavior among the signatories and sync private sector actions with intergovernmental 
obligations, resulting in a greater degree of certainty—legal and otherwise—in a binational 
relationship (Abbott 2000). This seems to have been the case with Mexico and the United 
States, at least until the Trump administration began to recast the relationship in more 
adversarial terms. NAFTA, for example—despite its limited institutionalization—has 
allowed the U.S. to pursue other strategic goals in the North American region that range 
from the war on drugs to stemming the flow of immigration from Central America. 
 
Through the 1990s, U.S. policy was to expand economic ties—particularly under a 
neoliberal consensus—and to influence political transitions to democracy in as many 
countries as possible. It is possible to argue that NAFTA did increase the viability of 
neoliberalism in Mexico despite several setbacks, and may have helped push through 
political reforms that resulted in a more open political system (Thacker 1999). Indeed, 
although the causal mechanisms remain unclear, it is plausible to argue that NAFTA aided 
political change in Mexico through closer economic integration with the U.S. and Canada, a 
hypothesis that had been expounded upon by early supporters of the agreement (Cameron 
and Wise 2004). 
 
It is also reasonable to suppose then that Mexico’s transformation in the direction of 
America’s stated goals of global leadership was advantageous to its own goals. A stable 
neighborhood with compatible economic and political institutions is more desirable than 
one with disparate goals and continuous strategic political maneuvering. In that sense, the 
U.S. may have been a big winner of NAFTA, due to Mexico’s economic and political 
transformation and its eventual self-definition as a North American strategic partner to 
Canada and the United States. 
 
9. Regional Security Collaboration 
 
By 2010—somewhat tied to the existence of NAFTA—a new idea of a close-knit North 
American continent had emerged, with well-integrated economies and increasing political 
and security coordination (Pastor 2010; Petraeus and Zoellick 2017). Such a vision would be 
difficult to achieve anywhere, and trade cannot be the sole basis. A deep and stable trade 
relationship, however, can lay the groundwork for an increase in mutual trust, which in 
turn can lead to collaboration on diplomatic, political, and security issues. Ideally, a well-
implemented trade relationship can also lead to bilateral (or multilateral) institution 
building. It is this chain of reasoning that led NAFTA’s accomplishments in the U.S.-
Mexico relationship to eventually be heralded as the beginning of a redefinition of North 
America and to be considered a good foundation for the deepening of cooperation in other 
matters, especially security. 
 
Despite the American public’s misgivings about a close relationship with Mexico—even as 
Mexicans’ comfort level with a broader relationship with the U.S. rose after decades of 
distrust—the U.S. government recognized that what happens in Mexico has an enormous 
impact on the United States. In the realm of security, this impact includes Central 
American migrants traversing Mexico on their way to the U.S. and illegal drugs being 
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produced in, transported through, and smuggled from Mexico. Starting in the 2000s, there 
were clear attempts to take advantage of the trust built through NAFTA and the increased 
linkages between the two countries—which may have all originated in the agreement—to 
expand cooperation in security issues. The Security and Prosperity Partnership and the 
Mérida Initiative are two such examples. 
 
Security and Prosperity Partnership 
In 2005, just over 10 years after NAFTA entered into force and before it was even fully 
implemented, U.S. President George W. Bush, Mexican President Vicente Fox, and 
Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin met in Waco, Texas, for the first North American 
Leaders’ Summit, where they proposed the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North 
America (SPP). This regional initiative was clearly designed to extend the economic gains 
resulting from NAFTA into a deeper security cooperation framework. Although the SPP 
was cancelled in 2009, it stood as a symbol of the desire to expand cooperation among all 
three countries well beyond a purely commercial relationship, solidifying the idea of a 
more closely coordinated North American region and giving U.S. governmental agencies 
unprecedented access to Mexican territory and institutions to help solve their security 
problems before they could penetrated U.S. borders. 
 
The SPP had its detractors, given the dominance of the U.S. in the agreement. Some argued 
that it was not “three interdependent countries with vibrant social movements, respect for 
labor rights, and environmentally sustainable economies anchored in provision of social 
needs and respect for cultural autonomy” but “an unequal alliance dominated by the U.S., 
complete with pumped up oil and gas production, increasing militarization, corporate 
transnational planning groups, and guest worker programs to ensure cheap, vulnerable 
labor” (Schiaccitano 2008). But overall, the agreement was viewed as laying the foundation 
for deeper regional integration with the security interests of the U.S. squarely in the middle 
of the emerging security and prosperity partnership (“Building a North American 
Community” 2005). 
 
The Mérida Initiative 
In March 2007, President Bush and Mexican President Felipe Calderón met in Mérida, 
Yucatán, and signed the Mérida Initiative, sometimes referred to as Plan Mexico. This 
initiative sought to achieve closer cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. (as well as 
some countries in Central America) on combatting drug trafficking, organized crime, 
money laundering, and other such threats. It was a broader and more ambitious initiative 
than the SPP. 
 
Under the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. government was to provide Mexico and several 
Central American countries with assistance that included police training, law enforcement 
equipment, and intelligence information; Mexico would essentially give the U.S. broader 
access to conduct joint law enforcement operations within its borders (Abu-Hamdeh 2011). 
The U.S. was to provide $1.6 billion dollars in funding for binational cooperation on 
security issues. Mexico would eventually pay five to six times as much and begin a frontal 
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assault on organized crime that has led to 125,000 deaths. Mexicans were willing to tolerate 
the death toll and high levels of violence because they saw the United States as a strategic 
partner in law enforcement and understood the need for the U.S. to operate in Mexican 
territory to curtail the actions of organized crime groups, particularly drug traffickers. 
 
The Mérida Initiative gave American law enforcement unprecedented leeway in 
conducting joint operations in Mexico. The CIA, the FBI, the DEA, and other agencies 
gained unparalleled access to intelligence and worked with Mexico’s law enforcement and 
military to combat criminal organizations and chip away at drug trafficking operations—
although the outcome remains in question, given that there has been little progress in 
stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and Central American migrants 
continue to arrive by the hundreds of thousands. 
 
To be sure, the Mérida Initiative had its detractors (Hoopes 2016; Hoskin 2010). But overall,  
it was largely viewed as an extension of a security collaboration that built on the strategic 
partnership that had begun with the consolidation of free trade between the U.S. and Mexico. 
Both the SPP and the Mérida Initiative were possible thanks to a series of transformational 
understandings of Canada, Mexico, and the United States as regional strategic partners—a 
vision that began with NAFTA. This kind of partnership would have been unthinkable in 
the political environment of the 1980s, when Mexico viewed the U.S. with considerably 
more distrust. NAFTA helped Mexico overcome that distrust and eventually see its security 
interests as coinciding with those of the United States. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
NAFTA has neither been the enormous success that its supporters believe, nor the disaster 
that its detractors claim. We cannot say that NAFTA was all good or all bad for any of the 
parties involved. In fact, we cannot even say it mattered much to the overall economy of 
the North American continent. The data reviewed regarding trade demonstrates a modest 
effect. On the aggregate U.S. trade deficit and GDP growth, the impact was negligible. The 
data on job gains also shows a net impact close to zero.  
 
This means that on an aggregate basis, judging purely based on economics, renegotiating 
NAFTA—or even threatening to repeal NAFTA—is not a high-stakes game. The treaty 
simply does not possess the leverage to deliver either a major boost or setback to the U.S. 
manufacturing sector. Claims that adjustments to NAFTA would alter the large trends in 
the U.S. manufacturing sector have little basis in fact. 
 
Only certain economic sectors of both Mexico and the U.S. were strongly impacted, 
defining the “winners” and “losers” of the agreement. This is an important point for the 
political economy of the agreement, because net numbers can disguise large, offsetting 
gross impacts. If the “losers” do not eventually become “winners”—by finding better-
paying new jobs, for instance—the treaty may have large impacts on inequality and 
political support for free trade. 
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Specific regions and sectors remain particularly dependent on NAFTA tariff preferences. 
Texas, for instance, is much more exposed than other states to disruptions of U.S.-Mexico 
trade. U.S. agriculture would certainly be harmed if NAFTA were repealed, as would the 
many U.S. consumers of Mexican produce. Further, cross-border supply chains helped an 
efficient “Factory North America” develop, which competes against similar supply chain 
groupings in Asia and Europe. Without those supply chains, American manufacturers in 
certain sectors would have struggled to remain competitive. The evidence that NAFTA 
made a big difference in the development of cross-border supply chains is weak. But to the 
extent that it did matter, eliminating NAFTA would harm the ability of U.S. manufacturers 
to compete against supply chain groupings in Asia and Europe. 
 
The labor market data indicate that NAFTA palpably hurt certain small-scale labor markets 
in a way that demonstrated “skill bias,” meaning lower-skilled workers were harmed while 
more skilled workers were not. Furthermore, NAFTA contributed to the large migration of 
unskilled, former agricultural workers from Mexico into the United States. This may 
contribute to inequality in the U.S. by adding to the lower end of the income distribution 
and increasing competition at the bottom of the U.S. labor market. The evidence showing 
the impact of lower-skilled migrants on lower-skilled labor markets, however, is mixed. 
Finally, NAFTA probably placed downward pressure on U.S. manufacturing sector wages 
in the 1990s. By 2000, however, the dramatic rise of Chinese imports into the U.S. 
overwhelmed any impact of NAFTA. 
  
U.S. manufacturing employment fell after NAFTA, and some of that decline reflects jobs 
moving to Mexico. However, the appropriate scenario with which to compare NAFTA’s job 
impact is not against pre-NAFTA job levels, but against what job levels would be today 
without NAFTA. In industries like auto and electronics manufacturing, job losses reflected 
the realignment of the industry into cross-border supply chains. As noted above, evidence 
that NAFTA made a significant difference in the development of cross-border supply 
chains is weak. To the extent that it did matter, we contend that U.S. manufacturing job 
losses would have been more severe without NAFTA. Accordingly, economist Richard 
Baldwin argues that advanced economies that resist “the international reorganization of 
production may find that the resistance hastens rather than hinders its deindustrialization” 
(Baldwin 2016, 148-9). 
 
Perhaps the most important impacts of NAFTA were three changes in sentiment embodied 
in the treaty. First, it locked in reforms in Mexico that lowered the risk of integration for 
North American traders and investors. This contributed to the large burst of FDI into 
Mexico. Further, estimates of trade impact based purely on changes in tariff and nontariff 
barriers ignore the confidence/sentiment factor, and therefore probably understate 
NAFTA’s impact on trade. Reassuringly, the reduction in risk and improvement in 
confidence now well entrenched. Simply eliminating NAFTA would not by itself precipitate 
a political shift in Mexico large enough that those reforms would be at risk. 
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Second, NAFTA played an important symbolic role in changing the tone of the U.S.-
Mexico economic relationship. It is nearly impossible to measure, but NAFTA brought 
global attention to Mexico in the 1990s as a location for U.S.-bound production that would 
have been difficult to achieve through unilateral measures. Now, however, Mexico is a 
well-known quantity as a manufacturing destination and trade partner in the North 
American production chain. Eliminating NAFTA at this point would not dent Mexico’s 
reputation much, because—as argued above—NAFTA was not the key variable in 
developing Mexico’s reputation. 
 
A third important impact of NAFTA, however, was the trust dividend that it has produced 
among all three North American nations, which has enabled the U.S. to pursue its political, 
diplomatic, and security interests in its own neighborhood with considerably less resistance 
than before NAFTA. By consolidating Mexico’s economic position as being 
complementary to that of Canada and the United States, and by incentivizing the country 
to continue its march to a full democracy, the treaty helped Mexico politically align itself 
with the U.S. and Canada. Mexico has been increasingly open to collaboration with the U.S. 
on security issues, especially those of undocumented migration and organized crime. This 
security cooperation would have taken considerably more effort without NAFTA 
strengthening ties between the countries. 
 
This third effect, unfortunately, could be undone by a repeal of NAFTA. Aggressive U.S. 
negotiation could create a chain reaction in Mexico’s national and electoral politics, giving 
the populist left a better-than-ever chance of winning the 2018 elections and making 
Mexico less amenable to cooperating with U.S. interests in the future, setting the 
relationship back significantly. 
 
This also highlights further risks, which is that aggressive trade moves against Mexico could 
snowball into a damaging trade war. Additional trade barriers beyond a simple repeal of 
NAFTA would certainly damage trade. Industries like agriculture, autos, and electronics 
and regions such as Texas would be disproportionately exposed to this risk because of their 
dependence on trade with Mexico for either customers or competitive advantage over 
other firms. 
 
Hence, as the U.S., Mexico, and Canada enter into negotiations over revising NAFTA, the 
United States should tread carefully. There is room for win-win improvements in the 
treaty, the details of which lie outside the scope of this paper. However, the gains 
achievable even through a radical revision of NAFTA are not large. Revisiting NAFTA 
entails risks as well, mostly for select industries and for U.S.-Mexico relations. The risk-
reward trade-off suggests that the United States should avoid an extremely aggressive 
stance in its negotiation strategy. 
 
  
Was NAFTA Good for the United States? 
 36 
Coda  
Ideally, this document would include advice on renegotiating the treaty. Trade agreements 
are amazingly rich in detail, and negotiations will likely center on complex topics like rules 
of origin and labor and environmental protection. However, the authors have restricted 
themselves here to topics where conclusions can be drawn from rigorous analysis. 
Unfortunately, beyond tariffs and a few types of nontariff barriers, there is very little work 
measuring the impact of specific aspects of trade agreements. The authors find no support 
to offer evidence-based advice on whether particular aspects of renegotiation would 
benefit or harm the United States. 
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Endnotes 	
1 That is not to say that Canada is irrelevant when estimating the impact of NAFTA on the 
U.S. The dropping of trade barriers between Mexico and Canada enabled new business 
models for American firms that took advantage of Canada-Mexico linkages, which are seen 
in the auto industry supply chains that operate across all three countries. However, the 
preponderance of changes in the United States’ economic relationship with Canada likely 
would have occurred anyway because of the earlier free trade agreement. 
2 Caliendo and Parro (2015) find a 118.28% increase in Mexico’s imports from the U.S. and 
Canada due to NAFTA in their full model, but only an 88.09% increase due to NAFTA when 
they run their model without intermediate goods and input-output linkages.  
3 See Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) for a discussion on different methods of 
measuring supply chain trade. The OECD classification used here attempts to avoid the 
potential inaccuracy of classifying intermediate goods by eliminating product lines with 
mixed usage. 
4 Note that these are aggregate tariff rates. Rates for individual goods undoubtedly deviated 
from this pattern. 
5 Specifically, if imports are not subtracted from exports, the value of intermediate goods 
will be counted when they cross the border initially, and again whenever they cross at later 
production stages. 
6 Most studies that have attempted econometrically to control for these other factors 
(exchange rates and economic growth in particular) have suffered from two weaknesses 
that bias the results in opposite directions. First, they mostly use trade data aggregated 
across all industries. Country-level data is well known to suffer from aggregation bias — 
that different responses among different industries or products may offset each other, 
falsely indicating no response at all. Second, NAFTA is measured as a simple year dummy, 
meaning the results reflect anything that affected the U.S.-Mexico relationship besides 
exchange rates and economic growth. Studies that examined time series data (Pacheco-
López 2005; Congressional Budget Office 2003; Garcés-Díaz 2001) suffer badly from these 
concerns, but the simple NAFTA measures for those that use panel data in gravity models 
(Montenegro and Soloaga 2006; Lederman, Maloney, and Serven 2005; Coughlin and Wall 
2003; McDaniel and Agama 2003) may also pick up other factors. In these studies, the 
devaluation of the peso in 1994 and strong U.S. economic growth during the 1990s 
accounted for a much larger share of trade growth than NAFTA did. 
7 Petroleum products were not affected by NAFTA (USITC 2003). They are a large 
component of U.S.-Mexico trade, however, so fluctuations in the price of oil obscure trends 
in non-petroleum trade. 
8 Imports and exports are flows, not stocks, so they should not yield a return. Also, they 
enter GDP as exports net of imports, not summed. However, exports plus imports as a 
share of GDP is a commonly used metric of openness to trade. 	
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9 Bahmani-Oskooee and Hegerty (2011) found NAFTA tilted the trade balance in several 
chemicals and electronics sectors in favor of the United States. 
10 The breakdown used here focuses on the sector of the input, not which sector uses it.  
A better approach would use an input-output table to measure what shares of all 
intermediate imports are used by the transportation and electronics sectors.  
11 Other industries like footwear, steel, glassware, and ceramics were also affected  
(U.S. International Trade Commission 2003, 2016). 
12 The percent increase is from Villareal and Fergusson (2017) and the share calculation  
is the authors’, based on Observatory of Economic Complexity data. 
13 Authors’ calculation based on Observatory of Economic Complexity data. 
14 Also hides and lumber. 
15 See, for instance, Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (2005). 
16 Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) do not estimate the labor market impact of reduced 
tariffs in Mexico on U.S. exports, which was presumably positive. Nonetheless, any positive 
impact was apparently insufficient to overcome the negative impact on low-skilled workers 
and industries protected by U.S. tariffs.  
17 Using 1996 figures on the education of the labor force from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Current Population Survey and counting those with any college as “skilled,” a 4% 
decline in wage growth for those without high school diplomas would imply an increase of 
the skill premium of 1%. This is larger than the impact that De La Cruz and Riker (2014) 
find: only a 0.005% rise in wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers.  
18 These two examples also demonstrate the difficulty of interpreting the industry data 
presented in 00 and 00 and noted in endnote 7. They are classified as mechanical and 
electronic goods respectively, not transportation. 
19 Not everyone agrees that NAFTA has been good for Mexico, even if it has brought added 
dynamism to the country’s economy. Some have in fact argued that it has resulted in a 
greater accumulation of economic and political power in the hands of a few. The paradox 
here is that even if we accept that poverty and inequality in Mexico have grown under 
NAFTA, undocumented migration from Mexico the U.S. has fallen (Esquivel 2017). 
